Bone Marrow Transplantation
Ethical considerations in allogeneic hematopoietic cell transplantation for children with slowly fatal conditions Peters and Krivit 1 published an ethical commentary on our case report of an infant boy with mucopolysaccharidosis IIB (Hunter syndrome, non-CNS involvement) who underwent unrelated umbilical cord blood transplant. 2 They argued that, 'in the absence of significant HCT (hematopoietic cell transplantation) experience and followup for MPS IIB and the wide range of clinical severity of this disorder, the physician is not able to accurately assess the real or anticipated benefits accruing from successful HCT. A reasonable person might argue that if HCT is to be offered for MPS IIB it should be offered to older patients (ie 8 to 17 years) at a time when they could assent to the procedure since it is unlikely that the disease process will lead to fatal complications during the first two decades of life'. Their commentary was thoughtful and raised important issues regarding informed consent and parental responsibility. We agree with many of the points but respectfully disagree on several others.
In our case report, we noted that HCT for neurodegenerative storage diseases including MPS IIA, especially when performed after organ damage has occurred, should not be performed. [3] [4] [5] This was not the situation in this patient. Rather, in this kindred with MPS IIB the disorder produced severe and ultimately fatal extra-CNS organ damage that was manifest by age 3 and produced disability in the first decade of life. In MPS IIB the disorder is usually clinically evident by age 4 years, the median age of death is 21 years, and cardiac, pulmonary, musculoskeletal and auditory abnormalities dominate the clinical picture. 6 There is no effective treatment for this disorder. It is true that the physician cannot accurately assess the benefits of HCT in this condition since there is substantial clinical variability in HCT-related toxicity and in the natural history of MPS IIB. However, the physician can with confidence state that there is a high probability that without treatment the natural history of the disorder will produce substantial disability in childhood and will lead to early death, although we do not know if that will be at age 15 or 40. It is a reasonable clinical hypothesis, that successful HCT performed before serious organ damage has occurred, may prevent progression of the disorder. The disease and therefore its treatment is rare and there is no established literature that definitively proves or disproves the hypothesis. There are published case reports that indicate that HCT in MPS IIB can be successful. [7] [8] [9] It is an established fact that HCT will produce mortality and serious morbidity in a substantial minority of patients. Do the benefits of HCT outweigh the costs? No one knows.
So what should be done? It depends. What you see depends on where you stand. If one embraces nonmaleficence as the overriding principle, HCT should not be performed since the toxicity is predictable while the benefit is not. However, strict adherence to this principle would prevent most medical research. In all clinical research a therapy with unproven benefit is rendered to test the hypothesis that the intervention is beneficial. We would argue that HCT for MPS IIB would represent investigational therapy and be justified on that basis, not on the basis that it represents the standard of care for the condition. If HCT is done it should be done carefully and with adequate followup to accurately measure the benefits and toxicity, and the results presented to the medical community. Since MPS IIB is rare, formal randomized trials of therapies will never be conducted. Careful case studies will need to be conducted and reported.
In our society investigational medicine requires written informed consent following thorough discussion of the facts and possibilities. In the case we reported the process of informed consent was very thoroughly conducted and parents and medical staff seriously considered the likely toxicities and uncertain benefits of allogeneic HCT. Detailed discussions of the options of no treatment or of waiting 10 to 20 years for the development of potentially efficacious gene therapies were conducted. The family had lived with the ultimately fatal disabilities of the maternal uncle with MPS IIB for 20 years and concluded the disease was not 'mild'. The medical staff and family were familiar with the failure of HCT to reverse CNS degeneration in MPS IIA, but reasoned that in this patient with MPS IIB CNS involvement was not the disabling feature of the condition and that the non-CNS manifestations might reasonably be expected to stabilize or improve after HCT. The case was presented to a multidisciplinary tumor board of pediatricians not directly involved in the patient's care. The process of information gathering and discernment was conducted over a 6-month period. At the end of this process the parents concluded that the risks of HCT were outweighed by the potential benefit to the patient.
In the ethical commentary it was proposed that in MPS IIB the HCT should be deferred until the age of 8 to 17 at which point the child could assent to the procedure. This proposition was based on the principle of the autonomy of the patient and the statistical likelihood that the patient would not die of the disease until late teenage years. While this argument is somewhat appealing, considerations of moral development and the natural history of MPS IIB would suggest that the decision should be made by parents early in the life of the affected child.
In our culture parents are charged with the obligation to protect their children from harm and to seek appropriate medical treatment for illness. In our experience the great majority of parents take this obligation very seriously and are capable of collecting and processing information necessary for making a decision to proceed with investigational medicine. Parents aged 20-40, in general, have had personal experiences of death or serious illness in their family, have developed a sense of mortality and risk, and are competent to make ethical decisions. The premise of the proposal to defer decision making until adolescence is that the patient is the one at risk of procedure-related disability or death, and by the principle of autonomy should play a role in the decision-making process. The problem with this approach is that the 'principle of autonomy is intertwined inextricably with the concept of competence, because only competent patients are granted the right to make their own health care decisions'. 10 While some children aged 8 to 17 display remarkable emotional maturity and insightful decision making, not all do. Many older children and adolescents have not had sufficient personal experience with serious illness or death to develop a realistic understanding of death, and often make poor judgments in risk-related matters. Thus we do not believe that deferring the decision 10-15 years a priori ensures a 'better' decision regarding a medical procedure with a biological rationale but unproven benefit.
Moreover, we hypothesize that HCT is most likely to be effective when performed before progressive accumulation of glycosaminoglycans leads to irreversible organ damage. If one were to defer testing HCT until the age of 8 to 17 it is possible that the intervention would come too late to be of any practical benefit to the patient. One conclusion from such a therapeutic experiment might be that HCT is futile for MPS IIB. If HCT were actually beneficial when used early in life, then future patients might be denied a potentially useful therapy based on improper clinical study. We believe that a therapy for which a rational biological basis exists should be tested in a situation in which efficacy can be realistically assessed, not in one in which the circumstances predispose to failure. If there is no rational biological basis for a therapy, it should never be tested.
We proposed in our report that the process of informed consent for HCT in such situations should be exceptionally thorough and that formal consultation of a clinical ethics service should be considered. This would allow full discussion of the facts and allow a member of the clinical ethics team to be an 'impartial' advocate for the very young child should the discussion suggest that the child's best interests are not being considered by parents and/or medical staff.
The real problem in this particular situation is that we do not know with certainty if HCT will be beneficial for a particular patient. Nor do we know that it will be futile. We will only provide the best care for patients by thoughtfully weighing potential risks and benefits for their individual situations and then conducting careful clinical investigation.
